Zhuangzi, The Inborn Nature and The Heavenly Dao
What is the “Dao” in Daoism?
ABSTRACT
In the Zhuangzi, there is a tension between pluralism/skepticism and the preservation of one’s inborn nature –often read as a form of metaphysical individuation. Can Zhuangzi’s skeptical pluralism (which is open to external influence) be reconciled with the significance placed on the preservation of one’s inborn nature (which seems closed to external influence)? Despite the seeming incompatibility between protecting one’s inborn nature (which entails some negation of the external) and developing a skeptical and plural approach to the world (which entails openness to the external), the inborn nature consists of the capacity for pluralism and skepticism (i.e., the heavenly Dao) and our idiosyncratic proclivities –namely, those proclivities given to us by nature that are not corrupted by cheng xin. Moreover, to protect both the individuated and non-individuated facets of our inborn nature, the pluralistic and skeptical facet of it must be cultivated; when one is on the heavenly Dao (i.e., when the skeptical and plural aspect of inborn nature is cultivated and thus, one is open to all possible dàos), one is no longer vulnerable to cheng xin. The inborn nature –a notoriously difficult term to define-- is given a twofold definition: (1) the capacity for pluralism and skepticism; (2) one’s idiosyncratic natural inclinations, untainted by cheng xin.
The Phenomenology of Non-Doing
The activity of ‘non-doing’ is the behavioral route to encountering nothingness advocated by Zhuangzi. "Forget things, forget Heaven, and be called a forgetter of self. The man who has forgotten self may be said to have entered heaven." (199 PDF) The phenomenology of non-doing is understood in terms of the distinction found in Zhuangzi's butterfly dream: "Suddenly he awoke, and there he was, the startled Zhuang Zhou in the flesh." (21 ZH) The awoken Zhuangzi resides in the ‘actual world.’ The actual world is the world of ordinary waking experience. Such experience phenomenologically consists of sharp distinctions ordinarily made between the objects of experience –especially between oneself and other objects.
There are different ways of being attuned to ordinary waking experience, but the conventional manner of attunement –the one which most people experience most of the time-- consists of sharp distinctions between the objects of experience, including beliefs (390 Wenyu), along with dogmatic attachment to one’s idiosyncratic perspective. The purpose of the butterfly dream passage, however, is to showcase an alternative manner of attunement --a manner of attunement that does away with sharp distinctions and one that is open to all perspectives in light of such non-distinctiveness: “He did not know if Zhou had been dreaming he was a butterfly, or if a butterfly was now dreaming it was Zhou.” (21 ZH) Zhuangzi –upon his awareness of the non-dual nature of reality-- opens himself up to the possibility that his initial perspective (that Zhuangzi is unequivocally himself, and not a butterfly) might be mistaken. Another perspective is thus considered and dogmatic adherence to the initial conventional belief is greatly loosened.
A phenomenological attitude –i.e., non-doing-- where the world is approached with an understanding of the non-dual nature of reality is ideal for Zhuangzi –“look at distinctions in light of the way.” (191 PDF) Non-doing is easily conflated with its semantically literally rendition: a state of total idleness. This is similar to the common conflation of the Buddhist notion of ‘emptiness’ with ‘nothingness.’ Total idleness, of course, can be one way to the way. Sitting meditation, for instance, is an example of idle non-doing. However, sitting meditation is not the only way to the way. Practicing meditators even acknowledge that the way is known phenomenologically in non-meditative active states too. For example, a chef is in a state of ‘non-doing’ when they are locked into a ‘flow state’ while expertly using their cooking utensils. Of course, the chef is doing something; but their attuite in such doing is not an attitude of doing (the chef is not thinking of their activity in terms of a subject fulfilling an objective, per se), but of being, such that the distinction between the subject and its objective loses its phenomenological character. Thus, it is important to emphasize that non-doing does not consist of a permanent residing in the field of nothing. “To understand what is done by Heaven, and also to understand what is to be done by the human, that is to reach the utmost… taking part in all things, they were solitary but never rigid.” (53 ZH) To understand what is done ‘by Heaven’, one must reside in the field of nothing, but not forever, for that would diminish one’s capacity for skepticism and pluralism –i.e., a crucial aspect of the inborn nature. Daoism is dogmatic in its anti-dogmatism and clinging to the nothing –illustrated by the Schopenhauerian ‘genius’ who meditates until they starve to death—is itself dogmatic.
Non-doing, therefore, is an altered mode of phenomenological engagement in the ordinary world, characterized by a newfound intelligibility of it, not an indefinite departure from it. (392 Wenyu; 110-111 ZH) Such non-dual awareness –which in the Daoist worldview, is the view of the world as it ultimately is, as opposed to how it is conventionally-- enables an agent to take up the pre-reflective and reflexive view that all perspectives and possibilities are fundamentally equal in value. Hence, universalizable normative systems are deemed incoherent. "I have heard that a bright mirror gathers no dust; if dust gathers there, it wasn't really bright to begin with." (47 ZH) A bright mirror gathers no dust, so a mirror that is not bright will gather dust. The dust here is a metaphor for normative external influences and the brightness is a metaphor for resistance towards dogmatic adherence to such influences. The mirror projects the equality of all such worldviews back unto the world –having neither flippantly accepted nor rejected any of them, but exposing their fundamental indistinctiveness and futility in the face of integral brightness:
What is meant by harmonizing with them by means of their Heavenly Transitions? It means ‘right’ is also ‘not right,’ and ‘so’ is also ‘not so.’ If right were ultimately right, its differentiation from not-right would admit of no debate… Thus, even though the transformation of voices may depend on something, it is tantamount to not depending on anything at all. (21 ZH)
Conventionally, we all have idiosyncratic perspectives on life and distinct ways of approaching it. Realizing that reality is ultimately non-dual, however, must lead to the conclusion that all ways of living and all ways of seeing the world are of equal value. What is right from one normative perspective might be wrong from another. Hence, there is quasi-operationalism at work here –the differences between things are only conventionally apparent. Ultimately, all views and value systems are equal.
Non-Dual Mirroring and Resisting Cheng Xin and Dogma
What are we to do with this realization? Zhuangzi believes that we are generally disposed to latch onto our idiosyncratic ways of perceiving and acting in the world. “Ordinary people of the world are always pleased when others agree with them and displeased when others differ with them.” (95 ZH) Yong Huang points out that this potent human tendency can be understood as “cheng xin,” which for Zhuangzi, is something that needs to be overcome; alternatively, for Zhuangzi, “[w]e should cultivate the part of us that spontaneously identifies with others, the state of consciousness in which the boundaries between self and others falls away. (Wong 1984, 208)” Wong, however, mischaracterizes Zhuangzi’s idea here by calling it an identification with others, when it is quite the opposite; instead, it is the non-dual awareness of others as represented in the mirror whose brightness casts off dust.
The practice of mirroring others is preceded by an important qualification: “Don’t let external compromise get inside you, and don’t let your inner harmony show itself externally.” (40 ZH) Wholesale identification with another person or value system is illustrative of inner harmony becoming compromised by external influences; as dust gathers, the mirror’s brightness diminishes from a state of integrity or was not bright enough to begin with, as it had no integrity –the latter being emblematic of cheng xin. This almost seems like asking for too much. How can we ‘be ourselves’ but also ‘be like everyone else?’ How can inner harmony keep its composure while we bring our behavior and thought in parallel with external influences? Assimilation of one’s being into the normative and behavioral standards of external forces --which are essentially damaging to one’s inner integrity-- sounds like a contradiction, and an intuitively feels like an unachievable state of being.
Zhuangzi’s non-doing is a phenomenological attitude of openness towards and an appreciation of the normative richness of other ways of living and perceiving things. Mirroring entails this openness and appreciation to the extent of comprehending those ways of living and perceiving. One may see that all ways of living and conceiving of things are equally valid, but to the extent that they are conceived of as the ultimate way of viewing the world and the ultimate way of living is the extent to which Daoist’s depart from other worldviews and dismiss their value. Apart from that, much is to be gleaned from opening up oneself to the infinite disparateness of worldviews through the lens of their metaphysical equality. One is skeptical of other ways of conceiving things to the extent that they are dogmatic. "Simulating others," therefore, is a potential manner of "improving our guiding perspective.” (4.5 SEOP) This guiding perspective is our idiosyncratic way of conceiving and living in the world, which may or may not accord with other worldviews, but may take from what does accord to incorporate it in one’s way of living and conceiving and dispense with what doesn’t –the mirror hopefully shows the latter to itself and projects it back out into the external from which it came so its equality is exposed and its dogmatic underpinnings are undermined. Skepticism is what is delivered towards those external influences that recognizes that your inborn nature does not accord with a certain facet of that influence, and in spite of that recognition, still attempts to push that facet unto you. It is in these lattermost cases where the inborn nature is corrupted by external influences –by the insistence upon believing in something, despite one’s complete inability to believe in it.
Some tales, by contrast, warn us not to expect the dàos of others to mesh with our capacities and character—as with the boy from Shouling who goes to learn the Handan way of walking, which “cripples” his original ability. Still a third outcome of the interaction, as with violent gangsters, reminds us simply to keep our distance. (4.5 SEOP)
Zhuangzi advocates for an openness to other ways of living and other perspectives in the world while simultaneously resting “content in the dispositions of [one’s] own inborn nature and allotment of life,” (90 ZH) which is a profoundly different notion than cheng xin. Cheng xin is the conviction that one’s own perspectives and ways of being are paramount and that everyone ought to follow them ensue. Whereas resting content in one's own dispositions is simply valuing "what [one] does with own self more than [one] values doing something about the world." (90 ZH) Non-dual awareness from non-doing entails respect for the way others live their lives and how they perceive the world, but a respect that acknowledges their normative equality; one no longer needs to do “something about the world” (90 ZH) to the extent that this “something” entails viewing the values of others as toto caelo from your own and therefore as something which needs to be altered and essentially done away with. In essence, it is the diminishment of value essentialism or egocentricity. Instead of imposing your values, opinions, and perspectives unto other people, you open yourself up to other perspectives, to the point where your own perspective and ways of being have more flexibility to shift in different directions. In this manner, the inborn nature is not obstructed, but enhanced and strengthened. One has done away with the imposing nature of cheng xin and has replaced it with a contentedness in one’s own way of being/perceiving things and a respect for the fact that it is of equal value to everyone else’s way of being and perceiving things –also known as “heavenly equality.” (77 PDF) In light of this respect, one is free to shift their perspective on things based on the perspectives of others. (269-270 ZH) “The ten thousand things all come from the same seed, and with their different forms they give place to one another.” (438 PDF) Hence, what Zhuangzi is advocating for is neither radical conformity nor radical individuality. Rather, Zhuangzi’s view is that pluralism and skepticism (the capacity for which being a facet of the inborn nature) bolster the inborn nature and are the antidotes to cheng xin –i.e., radical non-plural egocentricity. “For it is only by non-doing that one can rest content in the dispositions of one’s inborn nature and allotment of life.” (90 ZH)
The Heavenly Dao
Such skeptical and open-minded individuality is what Zhuangzi means when he refers to the ‘Heavenly Dao,’ as opposed to ‘Earthly’ or ‘human’ dàos which are forms of cheng xin. Through the phenomenology of non-doing, one who acts according to the Heavenly Dao reflexively treats others as they wish to be treated as opposed to the Confucian Golden Rule that we should treat others how we wish to be treated. (15 ZH) The former is expressly non-egocentric, and makes the Confucian Golden Rule appear far more egocentric than upon first impression. The Heavenly Dao enables one to approach others with their needs and values in mind, instead of assuming that one’s own needs and values are --or ought to be, even if through force-- the needs and values of all.
All dàos –i.e., disparate conventions—are grounded in the nothingness that is exemplified by non-dual awareness or non-doing (“what an abyss its dwelling place and yet, how limpid is its clarity!” (99 ZH)). “Heaven in generating people always gives them some vocation.” (99 ZH) Non-doing entails insight into the fact that all dàos spring forth from nothingness (the “field of possibility” (391 Wenyu)) and are therefore equal –“for this emptiness and stillness, this placidity and flavorlessness, this silence and quiescence, this non-doing –this is the root of all things.” (109 ZH) Living according to this salient insight is the Heavenly Dao –it is the Dao, not merely a dàos erroneously disguising itself as the Dao. (111 ZH) The Heavenly Dao enables one to look upon the Earthly dàos with a clear eye to their equality for the sake of positively modifying one’s inborn nature and protecting the inborn nature from their illusory guises as the Dao. (391 Wenyu) The only final value system is the one which does not recognize the validity of final value systems –dogmatic anti-dogma. Thus, we have a picture of an individual who appears as follows: ‘I have my own idiosyncratic ways of thinking and acting, but they are fundamentally no different from anyone else’s. However, my proclivities are different from those of others, and my ways of thinking and acting may or may not accord with such proclivities. Thus, I can look to the landscape of worldviews as a place in which I may learn to enrich my inner world with ways of thinking and acting that do accord with my inner proclivities. Meanwhile, I respect the fact that these ways are not everyone’s ways, because everyone has different inner proclivities that have different interactions with external influences.’
The pluralism of Zhuangzi hitherto expressed rests on a fundamental skepticism towards cheng xin and its attendant dogmatism and unsolicited, yet imposing charlatanism, for cheng xin is likewise grounded in nothingness. Thus, it is not value systems themselves that Zhuangzi urges skepticism towards, but instead their claims of supremacy above all other value systems –for all value systems have equal ontological grounding in nothing, which is learned through non-doing. We may therefore take each system at face value --not as something we must take unto ourselves, but as something we can take unto ourselves if it coheres with our inborn nature. In the Zhuangzi "absent is any sweeping declarative that we can know nothing." (100 Wong) More precisely, what is absent is any declarative statement that we cannot know anything. Instead, what is posited is that our knowledge of the world is quite limited, but in light of this realization, we ought to "embrace the continual wonder and the feeling of free fall it produces.” (100 Wong)
The penumbra said to the shadow, “First you were walking, then you were standing still. First you were sitting, then you were upright. Why can’t you decide on a single course of action? The shadow said, “Do I depend on something to make as I am? Does what I depend on depend on something else? Is my dependence like the case of the snake’s skin or the cicada’s shell. How would I know why I am so or not so?” (21 ZH)
The shadow, in this instance, has realized and embraced that the truths accessible to it are only partial; its self-conception is even called into question, as the basis of its self-conception -- through non-doing-- is indeterminate and thus up for question ad infinitum.
“It’s a galloping heat haze! “It’s a swirl of dust!” “It’s some living creature blown about on the breath of the air!” And the blue on blue of the sky –is that the sky’s true color? Or is it just the vast distance, going on and on without end, that looks that way? When Peng looks down, he, too, sees only this and nothing more.” (3 ZH)
Peng, of course, is a bird, but Zhuangzi’s well-noted use of metaphor is applicable in this instance. Our cognitive apparatuses are limited, and therefore, our ability to truly grasp the world is also quite limited. When we look up at the sky and see the color blue, from a modern scientific perspective, our a priori cognitive apparatus –say, our eyes and the occipital lobe—filters reality in a way that makes it experientially digestible; this filtering leaves out many details about the nature of the stimuli whose affection of our body produces the color blue in our visual space. This color is the product, however, not of merely inner or merely outer mechanisms, but instead is the product of a fundamentally limited information processing system interacting with world –other systems, like the brains of dogs, will not even produce the color blue with the same external stimulus. When we realize such limits, we realize that our pre-conceived notions on the nature of reality –which are egocentric and self-inflated-- ought to be looked upon with an eye of skepticism. “Any claim to knowledge of something important is subject to interrogative skepticism, even Daoist pronouncements when converted into claims.” (101 Wong) It is thus a skepticism towards absolute credulity.
The Inborn Nature (Xing)
There is a central claim in the Zhuangzi, which seems quite counter to the hitherto mentioned pluralistic skepticism. Namely, in the insistence upon the preservation of one’s own inborn nature (xing.) What does “inborn nature” mean? From the perspective of a Westerner, it would be quite easy to interpret the inborn nature as an abstract fixed subject whose changeability is based upon the decisions it makes through its freedom of will. (Keqian 456) If we were to read Zhuangzi's inborn nature in terms of Western individuality, there would undoubtedly be an incompatibility between preserving our inborn nature and pluralistic skepticism, because they are diametrically opposed. The latter would interrupt the fixed nature of the former, rendering it ‘corrupted.’ Western forms of individualism, however, are foreign to the Zhuangzi and cannot be thought of as synonymous with the inborn nature. For Zhuangzi, individualism is dynamic and unfixed –indeed, integrally related to pluralistic skepticism. Zhuangzi's individualism entails preserving the individual's dynamic and unfixed nature from being corrupted by fixed and rigid cheng xin. (Keqian 456)
As products of nature (tian or heaven), all things are born into the world with idiosyncratic characteristics –unique “natures.” (77 Huang) Furthermore, one of the primary causes of worry for Zhuangzi is the interruption of this inborn nature through external factors. These ‘external factors’ pertain to that which the abovementioned skeptical pluralism is meant to diminish: namely, cheng xin. Courses (dàos) with “excess webbings and side-branchings" (those ways of being which take on a rigid, authoritative, and final stance on matters like the nature of reality or morality –like "Yang Zhu and Mo Di" (78 ZH)) are the primary external threat to inborn natures. “In the Zhuangzian view, this nature should be followed and taken care of: ‘one should adhere to one’s inborn nature, nourish one’s fine qi, and follow one’s virtue’ (Zhuangzi 19: 634).” (77 Huang 1) Cheng xin is a product of humanity and its non-natural conventions, whereas the inborn nature derives from the heavenly and the unfixed and flexible natural proclivities it grants all humans. (176 ZH) Cheng xin’s humanly nature is exemplified in the description of its preoccupation with fame, fortune, and contingent desires. (78 ZH) The heavenly nature of xing, by contrast, is exemplified in Zhuangzi’s explicitly regarding it as heavenly. (100, 102, 212, 245 ZH) Our inborn nature is our way. For each individual, the way is my way; thus, the way must acknowledge that my way is not the way for others, but the way for others is valuable knowledge to know for enriching my way.
In allowing one’s inborn nature to be corrupted by dàos, we “hide what is Heavenly in [us], separate [ourselves] from [our] inborn natures, destroy [our] true dispositions, kill [our] imponderable spirits.” (212 ZH) In the stories of chapter 7 (68-73 ZH) of the Zhuangzi, for instance, what kills each character entailed treating these characters in terms of values and dispositions which did not cohere with their inborn nature; treating them in a manner that is against their nature, even if it comes from a place of good intentions, is not how they ought to be treated. Picture for instance Thomas Paine, a deist –if not an atheist—who was harassed on his deathbed by the clergy. The clergy in that instance are exemplars of cheng xin. A Daoist would have let Thomas Paine be without adopting deism, atheism, or Christianity in doing so.
This can be understood most clearly in the interconnectedness between xing (inborn nature) and tian (nature/heaven.) There are three sorts of “piping” that are mentioned in the Zhuangzi. The piping of earth and humans represent the dàos and their cheng xin. The heavenly piping, however, represents that which allows the earthly and humanly voices to simply be as they are, without interruption. (11-14 ZH) It is this aspect of the self –the one which entails the piping of heaven—which Zhuangzi is attempting to preserve, whereas the aspects of the self-contaminated by cheng xin, is that which Zhuangzi wishes for us to dissolve. (82-84 Huang 1) In no sense does this entail anti-individuality. Instead, it is simply a plea to respect the autonomy and values of others, but only insofar as this respect doesn’t diminish your own status as an autonomous agent. (84 Huang) We can see this quite patently in the water analogy presented in chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi. (48-50 ZH) Water is used metaphorically in this instance to represent the acceptance of other perspectives (water can work as a mirror, due to its clarity) without changing one’s form/shape.
One needn’t lose their idiosyncratic individuality to be open to the perspectives of others. In fact, this openness is precisely what permits one to preserve their individuality, by enriching it through the purview of ultimate reality. “[I]t is only the Utmost Person who can wander through this world without going awry, following along with others without losing himself, not imitating the teachings of others, receiving ideas from them without becoming one of them.” (223 ZH) While it may not be easy, it is certainly possible to be capable of pluralistic openness and truly retaining your individuality. Furthermore, regarding the relationship between xing and tian Huang notes that these words are used for the same purpose in different parts of the Zhuangzi. Namely, the way xing is used in the outer and miscellaneous chapters is used in the same way as tian is in the inner chapters. “For example [in chapter 3], it is stated that ‘things are unique because of their nature (tian)… [in chapter 6] we are asked ‘not to use our opinionated mind to impair Dao and not to used forced efforts to assist what is natural (tian).” (78 Huang 1) Which is to say xing and tian are used interchangeably, lending further credence to the notion of a heavenly Dao as characterized by the phenomenological engagement in the world in accordance with pluralistic skepticism or non-doing.
The heavenly Dao is not something we are all born into with great development, but we are all born with a capacity to develop it due to our being derived from tian. Xing is referred to in the outer and miscellaneous chapters, not as something we have when we are born in any actual sense, but rather, as a capacity we are born into which we can and should refine to the to make into a salient actuality. One’s inborn nature, it seems, is one’s intrinsic natural capacity for developing the pluralism and skepticism which, when developed, are characteristic of the heavenly Dao. There is nothing about protecting and developing this capacity that is inconsistent with maintaining individuality. If anything, for Zhuangzi, it seems to enhance the notion of individuality from a state of chaos-inducing dogmatic chauvinism to order-inducing pluralistic skepticism. (84 Huang 1) (34-35, 70-71, 91-93 ZH)
However, most people order themselves according to cheng xin. (212 ZH) Most will not enact the plural skepticism which Zhuangzi advocates for. Some people will inevitably and irreversibly succumb to the natural dogmatic and credulous tendency of human beings to consider things only in terms of one viewpoint to the exclusion of all others. Thus, you must protect your inner constitution –the heavenly aspect of yourself—from the influence of these individuals. Part of how you protect yourself is through mirroring; a good example of this can be seen in chapter 4 of the Zhuangzi, in the mirroring of the arrogant and narcissistic king. (40 ZH) One mirrors somebody with differing values to the extent that they are outwardly in harmony with the etiquette of the context one is in, but undetectable, you are unchanged in your inner composure. In doing so, you protect yourself from external influence by learning from it. This is in fact what non-doing consists of. (94-95 ZH) Thus, what one is protecting when one protects one’s inborn nature is one’s heavenly Dao –that is, one’s inborn natural capacity (Huang 77) to be open to other perspectives and to dismiss dogmatism based on realizing the fundamentally undifferentiated nature of reality.
Yet, the inborn nature is more this capacity; it also pertains to each individual’s idiosyncrasies. “What is long should not be considered as too much, and what is short should not be considered a too little. For example, a duck’s feet are short, but if we try to lengthen it, it causes pain.” (77 Huang 1) We can see this in the following sense: the abovementioned pluralism respects without adopting or giving favorable praise to other ways of living; these other ways of living, however, are referred to by Zhuangzi as inborn natures in their own right. (78 Huang 1) How can this sense of preserving one’s inborn nature be reconciled with the notion of pluralistic skepticism? If, as Zhuangzi suggests, most people are under the spell of cheng xin (95 ZH) wouldn’t one simply need to be in a constant state of defensiveness –non-doing and mirroring? Intuitively, it seems like this is what Zhuangzi is advocating for. Yet constant defensiveness is extremely impractical and antithetical to non-doing. (392 Wenyu) As Wenyu points out, such defensiveness is an aesthetic feeling, rather than a method of functionally thwarting the influence of those under the spell of cheng xin. (393 Wenyu) We can treat other how they would like to be treated (1058 Huang 2), but we are always going to come up against detractors, and to consistently stoop to their level or retreat into nothingness is antithetical to the open agency entailed in non-doing.
Are there any other options? Yes, there are, and, in following true to the Zhuangzi, my worries about the above option ought to be noted as resulting from my own inborn proclivities. The aesthetic feeling of mirroring and non-doing is equal in value to however my own inborn nature is best suited to handling external cheng xin. My way isn’t the best way –there is no best way. Zhuangzi's system of plurality must accommodate multiple different ways of handling external reconciliation, and it is feature of the Zhuangzi that there are multiple different ways of handling this. (34-35, 70-71, 91-93 ZH) One such option could be to, as Huang believes, simply act according to the heavenly Dao, with no expectation of reciprocity in mind –those who reciprocate your openness are to be engaged with, and those who don't are not to be engaged with, but never expect the former, for that is itself a form of attachment based on the ignorance of distinctness. Huang, in this instance, suggests that if others are not respecting other's ways of life, one has no obligation to respect such a person's way of life. (1058 Huang 2) While Huang doesn't provide evidence from the Zhuangzi to make this point, it is not inconsistent with the Zhuangzi insofar as it entails pluralism and skepticism as protecting one’s inborn nature. This is the rejection of dogma and credulity. All one is doing, in such a scenario, is being skeptical of someone whose world view doesn't respect the world views of others but instead sees itself as the supreme worldview; one's skepticism here rests as a reaction to such a person’s view if it is posited as if it is final, authoritative or ultimate --making it intrinsically worthy of Zhuangzian skepticism. Huang’s ultimate resolution here is to simply walk away from the close-minded rather than mirroring them or bringing oneself back into the field of nothing. Most people are doomed to cheng xin.
There are several scenarios from the Zhuangzi which may serve as an alternative to such persistent defensiveness. The first consists of a hypothetical state-of-affairs: namely, an ideal society. If each of us simply open ourselves up to other ways of being and perceiving while simultaneously negating our human proclivity to push our own peculiar perspectives unto others, there would be very little need to be on guard for the non-skeptical. Zhuangzi himself seems to hope for such a state-of-affairs: “if everyone does the right thing by keeping what one gets from nature to oneself, then it will not be imposed upon others; when what one gets from nature is imposed upon others, they will lose their own natures.” (78 Huang 1) In the context of the Zhuangzi, this isn’t the only method of reconciliation presented. Nor, in the Zhuangzi, is it suggested that this –or any other method—is the end all be all when it comes to protecting one’s inborn nature. For those more inclined towards mirroring, non-doing, or walking away, those are equally valid options in light of the fact that our natural proclivities for naturally efficient self-protection vary from person to person.
In protecting one’s capacity for pluralism and skepticism (i.e., one’s inborn nature), and in protecting one’s idiosyncratic natural proclivities (insofar as they are not tainted by the influence of cheng xin, as its clear that Zhuangzi wants us to rid ourselves of any conception tainted by cheng xin), one needs to take pluralism and skepticism into account –namely, in realizing that you have an inborn nature for which certain modes of comportment are best suited and through pluralism (taking other’s perspectives into account) and skepticism (towards perspectives plagued with cheng xin), you should find out (though meditative practice or intuitively) which mode is best suited to your nature. The ultimate way to protect the inborn nature from externalities is essentially to engage with them in a pluralistic and skeptical manner. Thus, in order to protect the inborn nature in both of its facets, the facet of it which entails the capacity for pluralism and skepticism must be cultivated. “Goodness, as I understand it…is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out.” (79 ZH) In the plainest terms, individuality is predicated on critical openness and dogmatic anti-dogmatism. Our capacity for pluralism and skepticism diminishes when we fail to cultivate it. Likewise, our idiosyncratic (non-cheng xin) natural proclivities are left vulnerable to others who are corrupted by cheng xin when we do not cultivate our capacity for pluralism and skepticism –for, such individuals are starkly against anything which does not align with their own perspectives on the world, and it is quite unlikely that your idiosyncratic natural proclivities are going to agree fully with their dogma; thus, through your lack of adherence to their worldview, you become a target for them to force their ideas upon you –i.e., you become vulnerable to individuals who have no respect for your way of living and thinking and in turn, they will wish to place control of how you live and think into their hands. Consider the old and useless tree in chapter 4 of the Zhuangzi. The consequences of being conventionally useful is being used and chopped away through usefulness, whereas being useless but neutral permits one to grow into old age unscathed.
Conclusion
Zhuangzi's approach, when speaking about protecting the internal from the external, is not incompatible with pluralism and skepticism, but indeed, it is necessary for it. What is being protected internally (one's inborn nature) is the very capacity to develop the ability to engage in the world pluralistically, skeptically, and with a consciousness of the indistinct nature of reality. Pluralism and skepticism are perfectly compatible with individualism, and in fact, they serve to protect and develop the ideal mode of individualism of the Daoist sage. The capacity of pluralism and skepticism (the inborn nature), need to be cultivated in order to protect the inborn nature. The heavenly Dao is when the inborn nature is cultivated.
References
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