The Temporal Ontology of Dasein’s Agency in Being & Time

What does Heidegger think of free will?

In Being & Time (1927), “anticipatory resoluteness” is the term Heidegger uses to denote authenticity. This term and its relation to the metaphysics of freedom and choice is both fascinating and opaque. Anticipatory resoluteness is a salient choice that human beings (Dasein) may make, but whether this choice is made freely is not clear. Upon close textual analysis, we come to find that authenticity does not arise from deliberate decision-making. Rather, Being & Time presents human agency as mostly passive but not entirely void of activity; human agency in Being & Time is medio-passive. This view entails a spectrum of activity and passivity, in which an agent’s place is unfixed. This spectrum is mediated by thrown projection[1] which denotes the paradoxical nature of human temporality as both determinate and indeterminate. 

Introduction

Being & Time is self-advertised as the intellectual rebirth of the ‘ancient’ question of Being. Indeed, Heidegger takes himself to be picking up where Aristotle left off in the Metaphysics. “Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being.” (B&T, 19) The question of the meaning of Being does not pertain to this or that being/entity, but rather, as Aristotle put it, ‘Being qua Being’ or ‘Being as Being’ –Being in general. Heidegger argued that Aristotle’s analysis did not amount to knowledge of Being in general. On the one hand, for Aristotle, Being is substance, and therefore, presupposes some entity. On the other hand, for Aristotle and Aquinas alike, all we can do is categorize this substance’s effects. “The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the process of destroying [this] ontological tradition.” (B&T, 49)

This question is not answered in Being & Time, as the book was published unfinished. Indeed, in the later years of Heidegger’s career, he reasoned that the meaning of Being in general cannot be said. Rather, with a quasi-Wittgensteinan mystical undertone, Heidegger says Being can only be shown. However, a Heideggerian methodology for understanding the meaning of Being in general is preserved in Being & Time, through the “existential analytic of Dasein.” (B&T, 34) Through understanding the ontology of human beings, Heidegger reasons, we may come to understanding Being in general. This is why he calls this analysis ‘fundamental ontology.’ A characteristic feature of Dasein is an interest in the nature of being –in particular, our place in that picture. Heidegger took phenomenology and ontology to be distinct terminologically, but metaphysically indistinct. The method of ontology, therefore, is through giving a pre-theoretical description of what it is like to be Dasein.

While Being & Time failed in its fundamental end, it succeeded in giving a rich description of pre-reflective human life, which is constituted by an inextricable social and pragmatic embeddedness in the world –Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘care.’ Being-in-the-world denotes Dasein’s intelligibility of things as always being filtered in terms the world it is in. Everything understood, is reflexively understood only in virtue of Dasein always finding itself embedded in a world. ‘Care’ denotes that Dasein’s pre-theoretical understanding of this world is made intelligible through a phenomenology of significations filtered by social and pragmatic relevance.

What it is like to be Dasein, for the most part, is to be immersed in practical activities towards some end, and to be embedded in a world with other people –we are, quite literally, pre-occupied with the things we care about. In each case, the intelligibility of such activities and social engagements are largely constituted by the social and pragmatic norms relative to one’s socio-cultural context. One did not choose these norms, for they were ‘thrown’ into them at birth. The power of such norms –referred to by Heidegger as ‘das Man’—is so great, that it is considered to be an essential (existentiale) characteristic of Dasein. One’s relationship with those norms can be modified, but not escaped. Our pre-theoretical submergence in the world seldom includes explicit reflection about these norms, and how they fundamentally, without reflection, determine our behavior and what we value. In other words, we rarely have human ontology as our intentional object of awareness. In fact, we go to great lengths to avoid inquiring too deeply into the reasons and values behind our average everyday behavior. For Heidegger, this is because those reasons and values are –for most of us, for the most part—null, rendering our behavior inauthentic.

Das Man and Inauthenticity

While it is the case that das Man is an essential characteristic of Dasein, according to Heidegger, the values that ground das Man are null. It is unclear who or what determines such values, and when you look closely at them, they often appear quite unfounded. To act according to the norms of das Man is to do what ‘one does,’ and for no other reason than that. So, if a certain political view is the norm in a certain context, one adheres to it for no other reason than because it is the norm. So too with behaviors that are banal, such as the basic civility we maintain in a library or public transportation. We behave and think in these ways because almost everyone else does, not because we have rationally deliberated whether there are good reasons to maintain these behaviors or beliefs. 

Of those who are tacitly aware of the nullity of das Man avoid facing this fact, because it illuminates that the actions of our daily life are normatively baseless. However, Heidegger does concede that many of us are unaware of this baselessness, and as a result, go about our lives inconspicuously adhering to those norms (the first form of Heideggerian ‘inauthenticity,’ dubbed as being ‘undifferentiated.’) To expressly unveil das Man’s baselessness to ourselves is profoundly burdensome. On the one hand, it is an existentially distressing realization. On the other hand, if one were to realize this and attempt to deviate from those norms as a response, one would almost guarantee severe social and practical ostracization and vexation.

The contexts in which das Man applies is indeterminate. It can be as narrow as the norms of a small family, or as broad as the norms of a whole town –or even the norms that constitute conduct when grocery shopping. No matter the narrowness or broadness of the context, it is an existential truism that Dasein’s deviation from the norms of their immediate phenomenological context is burdensome to it.

Authenticity and Calls of Conscience

Dasein has moments where the nullity of das Man is apparent it, which are called ‘calls of conscience.’ Heidegger’s primary example of this is anxiety. In anxiety, Dasein’s ontology is made transparent, illuminating its general normative nullity. For Heidegger, most people ‘flee’ in the face of this through self-deception. Such fleeing is what constitutes the second form of Heideggerian inauthenticity (‘lostness’). After having seen one’s Being for what it truly is, one returns to their life as wholly constituted by das Man, for the sake of disburdening themselves of the trouble it would cause one to do otherwise.

‘To do otherwise’ would be to ‘choose’ authenticity. In calls of conscience, one’s entire being is made transparent to Dasein. Part of this, of course, is one’s self, but as socially and pragmatically constituted by das Man. Another element illuminated, however, is one’s self apart from those norms. Whatever that might be for any given individual will differ, but in calls of conscience, Dasein’s uniqueness (one’s authentic-self or ‘ownmost’ self) is made self-conscious. Because das Man is existentiale, Dasein cannot shape itself wholly according to its newfound uniqueness. Rather, they can modify their relationship with das Man in a way that allows them to ground more of their actions in that uniqueness. Part of this entails Dasein’s self-preparation for future calls of conscience. Without such preparation, Dasein risks ‘falling’ back into inauthenticity. Having thus ‘chosen’ their authentic-self in this manner –as opposed to fleeing from anxiety-- is what Heidegger calls ‘anticipatory resoluteness,’ --Dasein’s authentic-mode of being-in-the-world.

The Temporality of Dasein

Dasein is ontologically constituted by temporality, which is a salient article of information conveyed through calls of conscience. On the one hand, we have thrownness, which, in a deterministic manner, delimits what Dasein can value, and therefore, how Dasein may act. On the other, Dasein is equally constituted by projection, which is the future path one is heading towards as made apparent by the actions and events of the present. If you are studying for the LSAT, your projection is towards law school. One’s projection may shift, as is well-evidenced in anticipatory resoluteness –i.e., the shift from being wholly constituted by one’s being thrown into das Man, to a modification of that thrownness on the basis of a newfound acquaintance with and acceptance of one’s uniqueness.

Dasein’s as temporality is, in part, deterministic (thrown) and in part, non-deterministic (projection). The context and conditions (thrownness) one was born into compete and coalesce with the decisions and events of the present which affect one’s future path (projection). Thrownness and projection behave analogously to feedback loops. The path your life is headed towards is influenced by current events and actions, but current events and actions are affected by your past and other incidental conditions. Likewise, all current events and actions eventually become past events and actions, some of which also being incidental, and therefore become part of one’s thrownness, further influencing the path one’s life is headed towards and its current character. Dasein’s very Being is the snowball effect of these factors –it is constituted by the never-ending push and pull between thrownness and projection, which is thus called ‘thrown projection.’ One can, for instance, make a better life for themselves (projection) on the basis of self-understanding, only to have someone or something from our past re-emerge to drag us back down (thrown). There is no normative direction that either thrownness or projection entails. The possible life outcomes for Dasein, due to its being thrown-projection, are truly endless.

Thrown-projection constitutes Dasein’s existential agency and [in]authenticity. By necessity, Dasein is thrown into being undifferentiated. Some Dasein never encounter a call of conscience, thus remaining inauthentic indefinitely. When no opportunity for transparent self-consciousness arises, anticipatory resoluteness won’t come about for such a person. Most Dasein that do encounter ‘the call’ flee from it, thus remaining inauthentic and lost. Very few Dasein are anticipatorily resolute, for, even the prospect of authentically modifying one’s relationship with das Man is burdensome enough to deter one from living authentically.  

Freedom and Agency

Heidegger states that authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness is a ‘choice’ that Dasein makes. This choice is fundamentally tied to the conception of freedom for Heidegger. The degree to which there is freedom in the making of this choice, however, is deeply ambiguous. Given Heidegger’s status as an ‘existentialist,’ it has been assumed that choosing authenticity is a matter of concocting and enacting new values for one’s self –something approximating Sartrean radical freedom or what is understood in a folk sense as ‘free will.’

Human agency, however, is metaphysically constituted by thrown-projection and therefore, is what mediates [in]authenticity. Anticipatory resoluteness is characterized by active agency, whereas lostness is characterized by passivity. However, the agency of undifferentiated Dasein lacks definitive characterization. One’s thrownness, along with its modifications through projection, determine how passive or active an undifferentiated Dasein is. The more active an undifferentiated Dasein is --insofar as they encounter a call of conscience-- the more likely they will be to ‘choose’ authenticity, and the more passive they are, the more likely they will be to ‘flee’ from anxiety into lostness.

Freedom in Being & Time is identical to anticipatory resoluteness and authenticity isn’t a matter of ‘choice’ as colloquially understood. Therefore, choosing authenticity is not a matter of exhausting one’s free will. Rather, it is a matter of being lucky enough to have a special sort of self-understanding in response to a call of conscience, which is itself an event one must be lucky enough to encounter. The odds of such luck in both cases is also mediated by thrown-projection’s effect on undifferentiated Dasein’s activity or passivity. This isn’t to suggest that those who have fled from anxiety have inauthenticity as their determined fate. Instead, their likelihood of becoming authentic is exceedingly low. Human agency on this reading of Being & Time is therefore dubbed ‘medio-passive,’ as it is neither the full activity characterized by contemporary notions of free will, nor does it resemble strong metaphysical determinism. Dasein’s activity and passivity, and its authenticity and inauthenticity are subject to an indeterminate degree of change over the course of a lifetime.

Free will is the view that humans are “effective agents who for the most part are aware of what we do and why we are doing it.” (SEOP) This view insists that our choices and life outcomes can be reduced to our active participation in them, and that we are, by default, introspectively transparent to ourselves. Yet, Dasein is only occasionally transparent to itself in of calls of conscience, and is necessarily thrown-projection. As Graham Priest noted on this paper, “human beings are contradictory.” In other words, our choices and life outcomes are not reducible to our participation in them. For Heidegger, we are neither an indeterministic "free-floating I," nor are we deterministically at the whims of fate. (344 B&T) We are somewhere in between. Free will, therefore, cannot be what Heidegger means by ‘freedom.’

Authenticity depends on calls of conscience, which are not events "one cultivates…voluntarily." (334 B&T) Where calls comes from is “indefinite.” (325 B&T) Likewise, understanding the call is not something one does in terms of deliberate decision-making, which is made evident by Heidegger’s definition of ‘understanding.’ “In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a ‘what’ but Being as existing. The kind of Being Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being[2], lies existentially in understanding.” (183 B&T) In his exegesis on understanding, Heidegger maintains that in each instance, understanding “always has its mood [or state-of-mind],” (182 B&T) and therefore, “in so far as understanding is accompanied by state-of-mind and as such is existentially surrendered to thrownness, Dasein has in every case already gone astray and failed to recognize itself.” (184 B&T) That is, we are, for the most part, oblique with respect to ourselves, This is the inauthentic form of understanding, wherein the world, rather than Dasein, is given disclosive priority –the intelligibility of things is filtered through the norms of das Man, which denies us transparent access to understanding our own being. (186 B&T)

Authentic understanding, by contrast, is when one’s understanding of things are filtered through an understanding of one’s own [unique] self. (186 B&T) This isn’t a complete understanding, as such completeness is, in fact, impossible for Dasein, because “the deep structure of human existence [is] … thrown projection,” (Carman) and is thus never complete. Authentic understanding is “Dasein owning up to itself in its existence” (Carman) in a manner that is irreducible to any third-person perspective. In doing so, one recognizes oneself as the locus of their commitments. This results in a mode of agency where an individual has an implicit feel for the demands of their context and an ability to handle these demands in an engaged and skillful manner, without succumbing to its overwhelming influence. (Carman 289-293) Choosing authenticity is identical to resoluteness –and is thus identical to this special instance of ontological understanding. (B&T 342) Understanding the call and making the choice, that is, are simultaneous, and are therefore identical. Resoluteness is freedom, not the result of free choice.

“As long as [Dasein] is, it is projecting.” (185 B&T) Projection can only be free in the sense that, one is resolute in the face of one’s possibilities through ‘choosing’ a path, and knowingly doing so at the expense of other paths and being content with doing so. Irresolute projection, by contrast, is ‘lostness’ in das Man –an unfreedom, characterized by self-deception toward one’s authentic possibilities. Hence, freedom is not what makes the choice; rather, freedom arises out of the choice –this ‘choice,’ being synonymous with understanding. (331 B&T) "To the extent that this Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is itself characterized by freedom, Dasein can comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwillingly." (237 B&T) One can choose one’s ownmost possibility, but this only occurs through understanding, which is not a matter of free choice. We cannot opt out of things being intelligible to us, which makes understanding not a free choice, but one of many constituent structures of our being. "As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of its possibilities." (185 B&T) All authenticity entails is the ‘interpretation’ of understanding –meaning, the development of it, wherein greater extents of the structure of one’s being are made explicit to oneself. (190 B&T) To be blind to your possibilities, or to the nullity of das Man, or to outright refuse to face these matters is to not be anticipatorily resolute. Rather, it is to have a non-transparent (inauthentic) self-understanding.

Although "awareness of one's ontological makeup" is required for authenticity, this awareness is not a matter of "reflective deliberation." (308 Han-Pile) Rather, it is a thrown propensity which some of us have or do not have –“Being-free for (propensio in…)” (232 B&T). A propensity to understand as being synonymous with choosing authenticity, indicates a lack of full activity in such a choice. "In understanding the call, Dasein is in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence.” (334 B&T) “In thrall,” meaning, it is in the grips of its understanding. This isn’t to say that understanding is wholly passive: we can increase our odds of authentic understanding by projecting ourselves upon a possibility that aids in interpretation. (309: Han-Pile) Nonetheless, the disclosure of such a possibility is heavily contingent upon thrownness (e.g., Being & Time the book is an authentic form of disclosure, but individuals thrown into a context where reading Being & Time is not possible do not have this form of disclosure available to them, hence making the propensity towards authentic-understanding less likely to occur).

If one has the propensity to, one may attune themselves to understand authentically. If one is successful, then surely they have played a part in ‘choosing’ authenticity. However, their participation cannot be what we reduce this choice to. It is, rather, a matter of being lucky or unlucky enough to have a propensity of such attunement or the lack thereof that determines whether or not one understands authentically. One’s thrownness delimits the degree to which one may be so attuned, and it delimits how much of a say one has in being so attuned.

The Will

Next, we shall examine the concept of the "will" in Being & Time as it pertains to the choice of authenticity. The Heideggerian notion of ‘will’ is often seen in academic discussions as a voluntaristic notion that precedes choosing authenticity. (42-44 Davis) It must be kept in mind that it is only in one’s care that one can become “free for it.” (159 B&T) Authenticity is not ontologically prior to care, but rather, it is a way of existence within the structure of care. Anticipatory resoluteness, rather than a notion that supervenes on care, is nothing other than the authentic mode of care. (SEOP: Heidegger: 2.3.2) “For Heidegger, life-defining commitments are always chosen on the basis of Dasein’s thrown identity. In this sense, I do not make commitments so much as commitments make me.” (457-458 Altman) Given the primacy of care, where does ‘willing’ stand in relation to it? Keep in mind what the care structure is: that "any Dasein is already ahead of itself.” (Mulhall: 156) In other words, in each moment, Dasein is always projecting upon a possibility –it cannot will itself to do otherwise.

"In willing, an entity which is understood gets seized upon, either as something with which one may concern oneself or as something which is to be brought out in its Being through solicitude." (239 B&T) Thus, the will for Heidegger is Dasein’s bringing significant attention to things in the care structure ex post facto. The will is “grounded existentially in care” and “care is ontologically ‘earlier’ than [willing.].” (238 B&T) In this vein, “Heidegger is clear that his version of the choice is not a primordial act of willing.” (308 Han-Pile) Consider this in light of authenticity being a modification of care, as opposed to something that is ontologically prior or posterior to it: “whether we hear the call is not a matter of willing ourselves to do so.”  (308 Han-Pile) The will, lacking fundamental primacy in the structure of care, makes the notion of ‘free will’ or ‘free choice’ as what determines whether or not one attains anticipatory resoluteness incompatible with the fact that “anticipatory resoluteness, being a mode of human existence, must be an inflection of the care-structure; so any fundamental ontological presuppositions about authentic resoluteness must also be fundamental to the care structure. They will, in effect, provide an indirect route to Heidegger's primary goal." (159 Mulhall)

Given that freedom is anticipatory resoluteness, rather than anticipatory resoluteness resulting from a willful act of freedom, ‘willing,’ --as Heidegger understands it—is present at moment of ‘choosing’ one’s ownmost self, not causally to prior to it. It is this sort of ‘willing’ which grants us freedom –it is a seizing upon, by being seized upon by an authentic understanding. In resoluteness, one's actions and beliefs spontaneously shift because the world is made intelligible in a new way through the understanding that comes with calls of conscience. One cannot simply will themselves to change their behavior or beliefs. This fact runs in both directions, as Dasein’s freedom is finite, and therefore "Dasein is always already in irresoluteness, and perhaps will be soon again." (345 B&T) We can always slip back into archaic modes of intelligibility. This indicates that the “conception of resolute Dasein [is] not as stepping into a fully autonomous agency but rather as being receptive and responsive.” (114 PAP) Resoluteness, as Heidegger says, “resolves to keep repeating itself.” (355 B&T) What resoluteness amounts to, then, is “the resolve to repeat (or be open to the repetition of) the interruption of willing in the experience of [nothingness].” (53 Davis)

Openness to Being and Later Heidegger

Authenticity requires us to be open to involuntarily being thrust into a state of non-willing anxiety. As stated in the previous section, willing is a seizing upon of possibilities. Yet, this is what Heidegger says resoluteness does not consist of. "One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, seizing hold of them.” (345 B&T) Heidegger states that insofar as he thinks of the word ‘willing,’ that is not what is occurring in resoluteness –there is not a voluntaristic calculus that is involved in the attainment of resoluteness. Instead, the language Heidegger uses in Dasein’s capacity for resoluteness is far from the language he uses regarding “willing.” He speaks about resoluteness as “letting oneself be summoned.” (345 B&T) Rather than a ‘willing,’ “resoluteness is a distinctive mode of Dasein’s disclosedness.” (344 B&T) Dasein, mind you, “is its disclosedness.” (74 Mulhall) And whatever Dasein is, must be part of the care structure, as "the being of Dasein is care." (275 B&T) Hence, upon Heidegger's reasoning, resoluteness is a non-willing mode of Dasein, rather than the result of willing; an event that occurs to Dasein which enhances its phenomenological awareness –its willing—as opposed to an event that springs forth on account of its attentional abilities. The usage of "letting oneself be" in relation to resoluteness anticipates Heidegger's proposition "to let beings be as the beings which they are –[meaning] to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself." (125 BW) Now, Heidegger refers to this as an “attunement.” (129 BW) In Being & Time, “Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind [understanding].” (176 B&T) It is precisely this attunement --one which is far from familiar (129 BW) and hence, consistent with the attunement we see in Being & Time-- which “makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its own most potentiality-for-Being,” (322 B&T) or, in other words, non-willfully “letting beings be” is what makes resoluteness attainable, not free choice.  

Heidegger’s retrospective view of resoluteness agrees with this reading of Being & Time. Retrospectively, Heidegger says the following: “The resoluteness intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being.” (192 BW) Likewise, concerning "willing," Heidegger says further that he doesn't think of it as “the performance or act of a subject striving toward himself as his self-posited goal.” (192 B&T) In this case, our openness is “an openness opened by itself.” (191 BW). In Parmenides, Heidegger's notion of resoluteness is contrasted with "the act of will of man positing himself willfully on himself and only on himself." (45 Davis) It is not the act of a ‘subject’ who wills its authenticity into being. Given that “man does not decide whether and how beings appear," (234 BW) and that the ‘choice’ of resoluteness is a modification of how beings appear, the will of Dasein (as "the fixed orientation of the will upon itself" (79 Parmenides)) is not free in its resolute choice. Choices do determine whether and how beings appear, but ‘choice’ here isn’t being used colloquially; rather, choices are, to some degree, happening to Dasein --rather than a subject deliberately choosing a possibility through a voluntary calculus that causes the subject to willfully choose in the colloquial sense of ‘choosing’. In light of these observations, it is erroneous to assume “[Heidegger’s] early concern with resoluteness [is] a hard-willed, decisionistic orientation –a Nietzschean or existentialist enamoredness with the power to fashion one’s world.” (283 Thiele) Dasein can only “take over” what has been thrown to it, and in deciding amongst these thrown possibilities, one is “undergoing a decision.” (Vallega-Neu: Personal Communication)

Medio-passive human agency and the spectrum of [in]authenticity

Dasein’s agency in general and in choosing resoluteness is what Han-Pile calls ‘medio-passive.’ “Rather than the deliberative making of a decision, the choice involves a special kind of readiness, halfway between self-possession and abandonment (‘letting oneself’). Just as the call ambiguously comes both from outside and within me, the choice seems made in me almost as much as by me.” (308 Han-Pile) Dasein’s agency is therefore ambiguous. (317 Han-Pile) A medio-passive interpretation of Dasein’s agency is substantiated in a few crucial ways. The word Heidegger uses in Being & Time to speak about Dasein's agency is ‘comport,’ translated from ‘sich Verhalten,’ which is a verb that is neither active nor passive, but rather middle-voiced. ‘Comport’ is not middle-voiced in English, but an active verb, thus leading to understandable confusion for English readers of Being & Time. (Egan: Personal Communication) Where this is also evident is in the language used to describe resoluteness: resoluteness is Dasein comporting itself in a manner wherein it ‘let’s itself’ be opened up to the openness of Being. Even in English, to ‘let oneself’ is middle-voiced. To let oneself be open in this way seems to permit some level of activity, but not enough to reduce resoluteness to the active participation of a subject. If it is the case, in choosing resoluteness, that “the agent participates in the action but without being fully in control of it,” and thus, the choice is “not reducible to such participation,” (317-318 Han-Pile) what is the nature of this ‘middle-voiced’ idea of Dasein’s agency?

Dasein is thrown and projected (183 and 185 B&T); determinate and indeterminate; free (authentic) and unfree (inauthentic). On the front of activity and passivity, there is a spectrum, and where any individual Dasein falls on this spectrum, varies widely, and their position on this spectrum isn’t fixed. There are a few ways this is evident. On the one hand, there are varying degrees of authenticity. For instance, there is authenticity which is not predicated on understanding Being-towards-death, and there is authenticity that is predicated on understanding Being-towards-death: the latter, for Heidegger, is the most authentic one can be (“free from the illusions of das Man” (311 B&T)), while the former, Heidegger says is bound to fall back into das Man intermittently (345 B&T). The greater degree of authenticity produced from an understanding Being-towards-death allows Dasein greater activity in its agency –it comports itself in a ‘freer’ manner than one who is authentic in the lesser sense, due to their lack of understanding Being-towards-death. That is, the more Dasein’s intelligibility of the world is under the influence of das Man, the more passive in one’s agency that individual will be –and the degree to which one’s intelligibility of Being can be under the influence of das Man varies indefinitely across individuals. For example, someone whose authenticity results from anxiety is more active than someone who has never received any call to conscience, but they are more passive than someone whose authenticity results from understanding Being-towards-death. On the spectrum of authenticity, therefore, the more one understands the structures of Being-in-the-world and the more this understanding informs one’s intelligibility of the world –that is, the more ‘resolute’ one is— the more active in one’s agency one will be. 

There is also a spectrum of inauthenticity. On the one hand, we have undifferentiated individuals who haven't gotten the call of conscience yet; on the other, we have those who flee in the face of conscience into inauthenticity. Both are inauthentic (B&T 276), but the former is less inauthentic than the latter. (Han-Pile 297) Thus, the spectrum within inauthenticity is a bit different than that of authenticity. The spectrum of authenticity is one of activity; by contrast, the spectrum of inauthenticity is one of greater or lesser passivity. Heidegger seems to think the Dasein who’s fled from themselves is more passive than the undifferentiated Dasein, as the former has “been surrendered to an artificial way in which Dasein grasps itself,” (229 B&T) whereas the latter hasn’t surrendered to anything –they haven’t received the call yet. One who surrenders in the face of anxiety is more passive than one who has nothing to surrender too. The former fears itself, whereas the latter does not, because it has yet to have the opportunity to. The former implicitly grasps that the social norms they’re adhering to don’t make sense, but they adhere to them anyway, while the latter adheres to them because they don’t know any better. In other words, one who is passive in the face of the potential for activity (calls of conscience) is more passive than one who is passive by default, having had no such potential for activity.

Finally, the spectrums of authenticity and inauthenticity overlap. The most active individuals are those who have an understanding of Being-towards-death, and the most passive are those who flee in the face of calls of conscience. Heidegger, in fact, characterizes these “extreme” ends of the spectrum in terms of their solicitude. The former “leaps ahead” of others, “not in order to take away [their] ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time…[helping] the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.” (158 B&T) The latter, “leaps in” for the other, taking away their care, either to “take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or [to] disburden himself of it completely.” (158 B&T) The most extreme ends of the spectrum, are therefore determined by their influence on other Dasein. The most authentic and active people aid others in becoming active agents, whereas the most inauthentic and passive people encourage others to flee and disburden themselves from authenticity.

Although das Man is Dasein’s baseline, thrownness heavily determines one's starting point and movement on this spectrum. Likewise, one’s projection (185 B&T) heavily dictates how our position on this spectrum can change. One could, through sheer luck, have a potentiality thrown to them which precipitates the call of conscience or one’s greater or lesser attunement to it (e.g., the right education or encountering someone who is at the extreme authentic end of the spectrum). For others, such potentialities may never arise –or one may arise, but the other doesn’t, and vice-versa. Or, because of one’s thrownness, one may remain undifferentiated and thus, blindly passive. Through projection, one may have experiences which poorly attune them to calls of conscience, making them either more susceptible to fleeing if the call ever arises or less likely for the call to arise at all. Thrownness thus establishes a quasi-domino-effect unto projection. Some might be thrown into dispositionally being more attuned to calls of conscience, making them more likely to progress through life actively –for, such individuals will be more likely to project themselves authentically, encountering more activity-inducing influences throughout the course of their life. And so too with not being attuned to calls of conscience, where their dispositional passivity makes it more likely for them to project themselves in a manner that makes them encounter more passivity-inducing influences. However, one might be dispositionally passive, but thrown into circumstances that influence them towards (projection) greater degrees of activity, making them more active in their agency. So too with those who might be dispositionally active but thrown into circumstances that influence them towards (projection) greater degrees of passivity, such as being born into poverty or crime, making them more passive in their agency. Hence, the spectrum of human agency in Being & Time is mediated by thrown-projection (331 B&T). A person thrown into being more active can become more passive depending on their experiences (which is determined by projection), and a person thrown into being more passive can become more active depending on their experiences as well.

Because the spectrum of human agency is mediated by thrown-projection, Dasein’s position on it is unfixed. This means that someone who is highly active in their agency can become highly passive, and vice-versa. Perhaps, for instance, someone who is passive met someone capable of serving as their "conscience." (344 B&T) Through genuine engagement with a resolute person (i.e., projection towards a future with or under the influence of this person), their attunement to calls of conscience may be improved, thus allowing them to be more likely to choose authenticity upon potential calls of conscience. So too with someone who is lost in das Man: engagement which is too close with das Man-enveloped individuals (i.e., projection towards a future with or under the influence of such individuals) may make someone who would have otherwise been ready for anxiety, and thus more activity-prone, less attuned to these calls (they are tranquilized (239 B&T) into temptation (297 B&T), as Heidegger puts it), and in turn, potentially more passive in one’s understanding/choosing of them. “Everydayness confines itself to conceding the ‘certainty’ of death in this ambiguous manner just in order to weaken that certainty by covering up dying still more and to alleviate its own thrownness into death.” (299 B&T) Dasein has certainty, but also, Dasein is its certainty (Personal Communication: David Egan), and thus in this instance, Dasein becomes more passive because of its becoming more inauthentic. “Falling,” (Verfallen) in fact, entails Dasein’s natural proclivity to pull away from its authentic-self back into the world of das Man in a manner that denotes deterioration. (42 & 220 B&T) Thus, changes in our activity and passivity “is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself.” (220 B&T) Indeed, “the tempting tranquilization [as mentioned above] aggravates the falling.” (222 B&T) This “has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities,” (223 B&T) thus lending further credence to the above-mentioned quasi-domino-effect.

If we are thrown into a future path that happens to better attune us to calls of conscience, we will be more active in the face of these calls, making resoluteness the more likely outcome; whereas, if we are not thrown into such future paths, we could be more likely to flee into passivity and irresoluteness. For some of us, however, neither arises: some of us may remain undifferentiated, without the choice to be otherwise (the call of conscience) ever arising, thus remaining passive. This too is mediated by thrown projection. Perhaps, through thrownness, one is disposed to only have a call of conscience through interacting with a resolute person: if, through projection, such a person never encounters a resolute person and thus never interacts with one, they will remain undifferentiated. No matter the case, the context which you are thrown into at birth, and the experiences you have as you press forward into the future (projection) determine the degree to which one’s agency is either passive or active. Thus, human agency on Heidegger’s account is not fixed across individuals and is not compatible with the contemporary notion of free will. Rather, human agency is ambiguous on Heidegger’s account.

In our average everydayness, we comport ourselves in a pre-conscience concernful manner towards our tasks and other humans. The choice one makes in becoming authentic in Being & Time is not a matter of free will. Rather, our comportment is neither fully active nor fully passive. It is "medio-passive." There is a spectrum within our medio-passive agency between activity and passivity. What mediates this spectrum is projection and thrownness. Some of us are thrown into possibilities that serve to attune us, while others are not. Those of us who have been so attuned are more capable of active comportment (i.e., understanding/choice) in the face of calls of conscience and are, therein, more capable of achieving authenticity. Those of us who have not been so attuned are more passive in our comportment (i.e., understanding/choice) in the face of calls of conscience, and therein are less capable of achieving authenticity. The latter consists of the majority of humans, while the former consists of a rare few.

Endnotes:

A Companion to Heidegger (Blackwell 2005) (Abbreviated: Carman)

Being and Time, Martin Heidegger. (Macquarie & Robinson Translation: Blackwell 1962) (Abbreviated: B&T)

Basic Writings, Martin Heidegger. (Harper Perennial 1993) (Abbreviated: BW)

Parmenides, Martin Heidegger. (Indiana University Press 1992)

Heidegger and Being and Time: Second Edition, Stephen Mulhall. (Routledge 2005)

Das Man and Distantiality in Being and Time, David Egan. (Inquiry 55:3, 289-306. 2012 –Research Gate Edition, 1-24) (Abbreviated: DMD) 

Rule Following, Anxiety and Authenticity, David Egan (Mind) (Abbreviated: RAA)

The Pursuit of an Authentic Philosophy: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Everyday, David Egan. (Oxford University Press 2019) (Abbreviated: PAP)

Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction, Daniela Vallega-Neu. (Indiana University Press 2003)

Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit, Bret W. Davis. (Northwestern University Press 2007)

Wheeler, Michael, "Martin Heidegger", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

Heidegger on the Struggle for Belongingness and Being at Home, Megan Altman (Frontiers of Philosophy in China , September 2016, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2016), pp. 444-462)

Freedom and the "Choice to Choose Oneself" in Being and Time, Beatrice Han-Pile (The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time; Cambridge University Press 2013)

Heidegger on Freedom: Political not Metaphysical, Leslie Paul Thiele. (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Jun., 1994))

O'Connor, Timothy and Christopher Franklin, "Free Will", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition) N. Zalta (ed.)

[1]  Abbreviations for citations are to be found on the last page with references.

[2] “Potentiality-for-Being,” meaning the unique/authentic self-conception one faces in anxiety.