Abstract

Almost all of the schools of ancient Chinese thought placed significance on the term “Dao.” Yet, these schools of thought fundamentally differed on what the meaning of the Dao actually is. Such is the case between Taoism and Mohism. This essay intends to compare these two disparate conceptions of the Dao in a new light: a light that will attempt to draw an explicit line between these two conceptions. Specifically, this essay will contend that the difference here can be characterized by Martin Heidegger’s notion of the “ontological- difference.” Namely, that the Dao for Taoists is wrapped up in concerns with Being (which, ultimately means a concern with beings in terms of their Being), whereas the Dao for the Mohists is wrapped up in beings (a conception which ignores the Being of beings.) The former conception of the Dao, being akin to Heideggerian phenomenology, and the latter conception of the Dao, being the antithesis to Heideggerian phenomenology. In section 1, I will explain what it is that the Taoists mean by the Dao, insofar as Zhuangzi understands it. In this section, I will utilize Heidegger’s notion of Being-in-the-world to help unpack this conception of the Dao, for these are, in certain respects, almost identical notions. In section 2, I will explain what it is that the Mohists mean by the Dao, insofar as Mozi understands it. In section 3, I will explain Heidegger’s “ontological difference.” Finally, in section 4. I will map the Taoist and Mohist conceptions of the Dao onto the framework of the ontological difference, concluding that the Taoists have a greater concern for Being, whereas the Mohists have a greater concern for beings.

Section 1: Zhuangzi on the Dao

At the beginning of Martin Heidegger’s Being & Time, Heidegger expresses his worry about how the question of “Being” has been formalized by philosophy hitherto his own formulation of it. Heidegger’s ultimate worry about the hitherto formulation of the question is quite akin to Zhuangzi’s worry about how the word “Dao” has been understood hitherto his own formulation of it. In this sense, we can think of both Heidegger and Zhuangzi as being reactive towards their philosophical predecessors. Heidegger’s ultimate worry about the tradition that came before him is that the way they spoke about “Being” was as if Being was some sort of ultimate entity or thing –for instance, speaking about being as if it were a corporeal or spiritual substance, which may or may not have conscience intentions. And based upon these erroneous conceptions, systems of normativity were produced. Unfortunately, because of its erroneous basis, these normative systems do not take account of the Being of beings/entities –which is to say, it did not take into account the true nature of beings (e.g. that human beings have an unfixed essence, which can only be accommodated for when you let beings Be –and therefore, allow beings to exist in alignment with what their essences actually consists of — , rather than impose external standards upon them.) “The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.” (26) The result, therein, were systems of normativity that assumed a fixed human essence. Hence, systems of normativity that entailed static rules –for example, Kantian or Utilitarian ethics.

Heidegger is looking to move away from this conception of Being, towards one that does not conceptualize the notion of “Being” as if it is some sort of thing, entity, object, or tangible-existent. Rather, “Being,” insofar as Heidegger is concerned with it, is what grounds the possibility of the existence of such entities and it is what makes such entities intelligible as such. So, for instance, Heidegger’s wishes instruct us to understand humans in terms of their Dasein –which, essentially, means the Being of humans. When we do so, we come to realize that humans are not static in their constitution –which, therein, makes overly-static normative conceptions of humans, a formulation of them that does not refer to them in terms of their Being. Instead, we realize that humans, in terms of their Being, are thrust into a world wherein their inner-nature is determined by the world they were arbitrarily thrown into and that this inner-nature is in flux throughout our lives. Generally, in our Being, we are pre-reflexively, pragmatically, and affectively engaged with people, tasks, and equipment; to “let beings Be,” is simply to unperturbably allow humans to continually engage in this manner –so as to open ourselves up to the nature of Being, rather than to simply think of things as static and turn our backs on the true nature of Being. There is nothing normative nor prescriptive about this. Rather, it is simply to live our lives without being extracted out of our affective engagement with things that matter to our own most-self (our “inner nature,” so to speak.)

When it comes to the Dao, Zhuangzi is in a similar predicament as Heidegger was when it came to “Being.” Namely, Zhuangzi was dissatisfied with his predecessors’ rendition of the word “Dao.” In what way? His predecessors –which, relevant to this context, are Confucius and Mozi — utilized the word “Dao” as “a set of practices designed to guide one’s behavior in some specific way so as to promote the attainment of some predetermined value or object.” (xxii) These practices consisted of static normative principles. Confucius and Mozi, therefore, used “Dao” as a word to represent their tradition of values and behaviors –and these values and behaviors are formulated in specific guidelines for people to follow; when conceived of in this manner, the Dao is normative and prescriptive. This conception of the Dao is quite concerned with how it is that humans act. Namely, the assumption is that humans are not acting “correctly.” Due to this lack of “correctness” in the behavior of humans, thinkers like Mozi and Confucius are attempting to put humans on the “path” towards “correct” behavior. Hence, the normative formulation of the Dao we see in Mozi and Confucius is an attempt to re-engineer how humans act through specific guidelines which –in the case of Mozi — they must follow.

Zhuangzi’s notion of the Dao is a radical and reactionary shift away from the Confucian and Mohist conception of the Dao. Namely, the Dao for Zhuangzi is not normative or prescriptive. Under Zhuangzi’s Dao, there is no sense that anyone must do anything that they do not want to do. Indeed, it outright rejects normativity and prescriptive guidelines: “Confronting the world with your virtuosity — let it rest, give it up! Drawing a straight line upon this earth and then trying to walk along it –danger, peril!” (43) The Dao for Zhuangzi is the opposite of drawing a straight-line: namely, it is rejecting any explicitly drawn out guidelines, and instead, going along with “the ‘thisness,’ relying on the rightness of the present ‘this.’ (16) What might such going along with the present “this” mean? Firstly, Zhuangzi was a naturalist: like Spinoza, Zhuangzi was under no illusions that we were somehow separate –let alone, over and above — the natural world. All human proclivities are a product of nature –tian or Heaven. One such proclivity, is what Zhuangzi refers to as our “inborn nature” (xing). (80) It isn’t straightforward what is meant by inborn nature. There is indication in the Zhuangzi, however, that indicates that our inborn nature is an element of the Being of all living beings: “All living beings in the world spring to life as if lured forth, not knowing how they are born. Obliviously they all come to have what they have somehow, without knowing how they do so.” (79) This particular quote echoes Heidegger’s notion of thrownness from Being & Time; thrownness is the fact that it is essential to my Being that I cannot help but find myself in a world that matters to me and the parts of it that matter to me, is also something I cannot help. (234 B&T) And for Heidegger, the idea is to simply go along with what it is that just so happens to truly matter to me –even if it is arbitrary, due to my thrownness, it is still what matters to me as opposed to what matters to others or the norms of the context I reside in. This is simply to Be in a way that is consistent with your inner-nature, insofar as it separates you from others in its uniqueness. Maybe my inner-nature, for instance, is to be a philosopher: thus, in writing this essay (and specifically, to just write it, rather than to theoretically think about writing it and the reasons why I am writing it), I am following my present “this.” To not do this –say, to give in to the talk of others that says philosophy is not a lucrative path — is to adhere to a normative structure outside of myself –such is the antithesis of letting beings Be. It is to make the course known, and therefore, to no longer be on the course.

In the context of Zhuangzi’s lamentations regarding making the Dao explicit and in doing so, prescribing specific normative guidelines for people to follow –i.e., “some external thing,” — we see Zhuangzi saying, “Now a small confusion is easily remedied, but a great confusion can alter the inborn nature.” (79) In other words, there is some sort of disruption of the above-mentioned thrownness-Esque ontological state-of-affairs when the Dao is made explicit as the Dao. When I am on the path of philosophy and I begin to talk too much about it, my actual Being with respect to this path is no longer on this path. Rather, my Being is elsewhere –namely, concerned about beings and norms outside of myself, which may or may not approve of my path. This is a great confusion that alters my inborn nature. A small confusion might just be when I am on the path of philosophy, maybe I fail to understand Heidegger: but this is easily remedied –I can simply speak to my professor about my confusion, which is part of being on the path (I am not making my path explicit in such a situation.) Therein, inborn nature is, at least in part, something akin to Heideggerian thrownness.

More precisely, though, is that the Dao for Zhuangzi is quite akin to Heideggerian Being-in-the-world –thrownness, simply being a central concept to Being-in-the-world. Zhuangzi cites Laozi in his conception of the Dao: namely, in chapter 19 of the Daodejing, wherein Laozi instructs us to do away with normative structures such as “holiness,” “wisdom,” “morality,” “justice,” “industry,” and “profit” so as to “let all things take their course.” (Daodejing 19) The ontology Heidegger presents in Being & Time, so as to lay the ground for his exegesis of Being-in-the-world, is likewise strictly opposed to explicit normative structures. (34 B&T) That is, in either case –with the Dao and with Being-in-the-world — the concern is not so much how we ought to act. Indeed, strictly speaking, Zhuangzi and Heidegger are not concerned with some set of rules and restrictions upon which humans should act, but rather, they’re interested in how it is that things are –apart from external impositions of rules and customs — and simply letting such things be that way. Heidegger might refer to this as “letting beings Be.” Heidegger’s reasoning for this is for the sake of disclosing Being in general –which he believes “letting beings Be,” allows for. (Basic Writings 130) Say, for instance, that you come upon a tree which strikes your eye as compelling. For thinkers like Zhuangzi and Heidegger, the notion of empirically/normatively analyzing the tree (e.g., taking samples from the tree, placing moral weight on the significance of the tree, or even cutting it down for research) is the antithesis to how we ought to approach such a tree. “Physics, physiology, and psychology… explain to us that what we see and accept is properly not a tree but in reality a void, thinly sprinkled with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon at enormous speeds.” (137: A Guide for the Perplexed) Encountering the tree in this manner effectively ruins the possibility of having a genuine “face-to-face” meeting with the tree –effectively negating what Zhuangzi refers to as “the present this.” Namely, it is a negation of truly experiencing the world as it presents itself to us. Approaching the tree in this manner is to make the course (Dao) explicit, and thereby make render the course as something that is no longer the course. When we simply experience the tree as it presents itself to us in our consciousness, without preconceived notions or theoretical speculations, we are following the Course. Zhuangzi and the Taoists believe that this is how we (when we are on the course) approach all experiences: without pre-conceived notions or theoretical speculations. Instead, when on the Course, when we approach our experiences we suspend our judgment or rational/normative speculations and just let the experience unfold naturally. What is being proposed, then, is to not annihilate our natural experiences in the world by veiling them with normativity and rational analysis; rather, we should simply experience such things as they are, without judgment or conceptions of contingency.

This, it seems, is what Zhuangzi means by “non-doing.” (Zhuangzi 96) “And what is meant by ‘one’s course’? There is a course of Heaven and a Course of Man. The Course of Heaven is to be exalted in non-doing.” (Zhuangzi 96) “Non-doing,” is not akin to Nietzsche’s impression of Buddhism as a nihilistic negation of the will-to-live. Non-doing, instead, is quite multifaceted: on the one hand, non-doing seems to be akin to the Stoic notion of not allowing external factors –e.g. the people, society, or norms that surround you every day — to determine the nature of your internal Being. As expressed in chapter 20 of the Daodejing, one’s inner constitution should strictly be self-determined, rather than externally determined. It does not matter, for instance, that “other people are bright,” when “I alone am dark.” Part of what constitutes the Dao is resoluteness in the face of the fact that “I am different from ordinary people.” (Daodejing: 20) This is what it means to “rest content in the dispositions of [one’s] inborn nature.” (Zhuangzi 90) It is a valuation of “one’s own-most self” as opposed to a valuation of the world and things external to your own-most self. (Ibid. 90) Such valuation is the route to order and by contrast, the further we go astray from such a valuation, the more disorder comes about. The more, therefore, that we impose guidelines upon the agency of humans, the more we impose our willful desires based upon external values upon nature, which is the cause of disorder. With the latter, the more we are worried about the tree as some sort of scientific or moral entity, and the less we simply let the tree Be a tree –by approaching it without judgment or preconceived notions — the more disorder will arise. This way of thinking applies to our approach to all beings, including ourselves. Such is what Zhuangzi’s Dao consists of.

The above conception of the Dao complements that which we find in chapter 36 of the Daodejing, for which Zhuangzi echoes: “The fish should not leave the deep pool.” (86) The idea here is that the fish, in its inborn nature, belongs in the deep pool. When it is left alone –when we let it Be — it simply ends up in the deep pool. So too with someone’s whose inborn nature tends towards philosophy, in their belonging in the ivory tower, for instance. When we let the inborn philosopher Be, it simply ends up in the ivory tower. Disorder arises when –through the imposition of strict normative guidelines — we take beings out from where they belong, so as to adhere to such guidelines. When we take the philosopher out of the ivory tower and into the ‘real world’ –say, for instance, in the U.S.’s market culture, we put the philosopher in a cubicle — we are disrupting the philosopher’s inborn nature and therein creating disorder. Order is, in some sense, when every being is where it belongs, according to its inborn nature. When we simply allow beings to flourish in their inborn nature, that is when we are allowing the Dao to run its course, so to speak –and, in doing so, effectively ameliorating the potential for unnecessary chaos. “The Master allows things to happen. She shapes events as they come. She steps out of the way and lets the Dao speak for itself.” (Daodejing: 45) By contrast, if something external to the fish takes the fish out of the deep pool and into, say, a shallow pool, it could die, it could kill, or it could simply be miserable. So too would be the case if the fish –to anthropomorphize the fish — became preoccupied with shallow pools because he’s listening too much to his fish friend’s interests, and based on this preoccupation, moves to a shallow pool. Humans –and all other beings — for Zhuangzi, are akin to this fish.

There is a phenomenological way to describe letting the “Dao speak for itself.” In Heideggerian phenomenology, the notion of circumspection is helpful. (B&T 98–99) Think about when you are simply going about your day normally; during the course of your average everyday life, you use tools, wear shoes, engage with other people, engage with projects, and while you are doing all of this, the idea is that you are seldom explicitly reflecting upon doing such things. For instance, picture when you do something as simple as walk into a room to grab a snack; when you open the door to the refrigerator in a “circumspect” manner, you do not have to even think about it. Rather, you just do it. When you are at work and are hammering a nail, you do not think to yourself about such hammering; rather, you simply do the hammering. Now, to think about this in Zhuangzian terms, let us say that hammering is what constitutes your inborn nature: being someone who hammers is the place where you belong, so to speak –not because anyone told you to hammer, but simply because you are naturally drawn to hammering without any external prompts. Maintaining this pre-cognitive, reflexive and, most crucially, un-perturbed mode-of-being is what non-doing is, and therein, is what constitutes the lifeblood of the Dao for Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi refers to this as “simplemindedness,” which is consistent with the above Heideggerian reading: when one is, so to speak, “in the Dao,” their phenomenological experience of things is circumspect –a narrow-minded and non-reflective experience of acting according to one’s inborn nature. (82) Such an inborn nature and pre-cognitive adherence to it is something that is a priori to any normative notions (Zhuangzi footnote); the root of chaos (and, therefore, what it is to veer away from the Dao) for Zhuangzi is when what is a posteriori (e.g. strict normative rules and theoretical thinking) is given precedence over our a priori inborn nature or, when the latter is made explicit. The Dao, in essence, is allowing beings to Be –not regarding beings as “external” objects which need rules, or, which need to be regulated in some manner, but rather, regarding beings in terms of their Being or inborn nature.

Section 2: The Dao in Mohism

Mozi’s conception of the Dao is precisely the sort of conception that Zhuangzi and the Taoists were worried about. Namely, a conception that entails explicit normative guidelines for people to follow. Indeed, Mohism’s conception of the Dao is explicitly concerned with externalities and controlling the way beings act, as opposed to that of Taoism, which is much more concerned with the flourishing of inborn natures and allowing beings to Be.

In Mohism, there is a profound emphasis on morality and morality as consisting of the adherence to rules. The Dao, under this conception, is a path towards an explicitly articulated end-goal: namely, the quasi-utilitarian betterment of all beings. That is, what is in mind when Mozi thinks of the Dao is the production of behavior that will promote the general welfare or ‘benefit’ of as many people as possible. “The task of the benevolent is surely to diligently seek to promote the benefit of the world and eliminate harm to the world and to take this as a model throughout the world. Does it benefit people? Then do it. Does it not benefit people? Then stop.” (Book 32, “Condemning Music.”)

There are various pre-conceived notions on what it is that actually benefits everyone –none of them entail just letting beings Be, as they are in their inborn nature. One is conceiving of a universalizable conception of morality, wherein a system of moral education is created to encourage everyone to act in a specific manner. Not only is a system of education set up for such encouragement, but the ideal state of affairs for Mozi consists of a government and culture which inculcates such moral doctrines. Manifestly, then, Mozi is not interested in simply letting beings Be. Rather, Mozi is interested in negating the ability for beings to Be and instead, insisting upon beings acting in a specific way that may or may not align with their inborn nature –insofar as Zhuangzi understands the word “inborn nature.” Mozi’s prime interest is to promote the benefit (li) and eliminate the harm (hai) of as many beings as possible. Such benefit is not tiered towards individuals, but rather, the collective. If we bring this notion of the Dao to its logical conclusion, if non-doing is on the list of what could harm beings, non-doing is to be done away with. If what is in alignment with your inborn nature is not in alignment with Heaven’s intent, your inborn nature is to be done away with. Insofar as everyone simply sticks to the guidelines, chaos will be ameliorated.

The doctrines of Mohism are made explicit in the Mozi. What promotes the benefit of the collective –i.e., the Dao — consists of things like “promoting the worthy” and “identifying upward.” With the former, the idea is that we ought to have our government and civilization run by benevolent individuals who are interested in promoting the benefit of the collective. With the latter, these “worthy” individuals ought to serve as a moral example for everyone to follow. In either case, the goal is as much adherence to the universal normative guidance as possible. Next, we have “inclusive care” which is a strict departure from Zhuangzi’s non-worry about external things. Inclusive care is to show an empathetic and genuine concern for the lives of those around you and in doing so, seek to benefit them in any way that you can. Part of this includes condemning things like unprovoked aggression, music, fatalism, and excess in luxury/burial. What will benefit others is if you admonish them for not following the Mohist guidelines. Mozi believes that, when we fail to condemn such things, we begin to waste resources –both material and psychological — which necessarily means that there are resources that are not going towards promoting the benefit of the collective. Indeed, these resources are instead more likely promoting the benefit of an individual selfishly –such selfishness is what Mozi believes is the source of disorder.

Where do all of these normative principles come from for Mozi? They come from Heaven (Tian, which means ‘the sky’) and its intention. Heaven, which the Mohists regarded as the noblest and most ethical being in the universe –a being who impartially believes in the moral goodness of promoting the benefit of all. The Mohists regarded heaven as a “quasi-personal God,” which is evident in the Mozi through its many anthropomorphic representations of Heaven –its ability to reward, punish, desire, judge, etc. Therefore, Heaven’s intention, we are instructed, must serve as a moral model for us to follow. Insofar as we are following this model, we are living according to the Dao. What this manifests into, is a system of normative principles wherein all beings are to be treated in an impartially equal manner. Heaven cannot be wrong and therefore, we ought to resemble heaven in our agency with respect to our behavior.

Section 3: The Ontological Difference

Without expressly making any comparisons, it should be fairly obvious that Zhuangzi and Mozi do not agree when it comes to the notion of the “Dao.” But how is it that they do not agree? I will argue in section 4, that the main difference between these two conceptions of the Dao rests in what Heidegger calls the “ontological difference.” What is this ontological difference?

The ontological difference for Heidegger is a crucial distinction. It is, essentially, the distinction between Being and beings. What is “Being” and how is “Being” (with a capital “B”) different from “beings” (with a lower-case “b”). Being, in essence, is what makes beings intelligible as beings. Whatever “Being” is, is not itself a being: “The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.” (B&T 26) Being is “nothing” aside from this. Which is to say, Being cannot be conceived of as some sort of overarching ontological entity, wherein all beings reside (in a material-spatial sense of the word “reside.”) Being is not an ultimate being, such as “God” or “Heaven” which has intentions, is a substance, has thoughts, is an idea, and/or can be anthropomorphized. We cannot point to Being, as we can point to beings. For instance, I can point to a corporeal person, but I cannot point to a person’s Being, as it is not something that is tangible. Yet, the latter is what makes the former intelligible to me. For example, the corporeal manifestation of my girlfriend is not what makes her intelligible to me as a person; nor does any universalizable normative conception of people in general serve to make my girlfriend intelligible to me. Rather, it is her Being –namely, as someone who I am with in the world, who also has concerns peculiar to her (inborn nature), which she may or may not act upon in her day-to-day life (ideally, she does act upon such peculiar concerns). This is the phenomenological difference.

What is the point of this distinction? Heidegger’s main worry is that in the history of Western philosophy as it pertains to ontology, there has been a total failure to heed this difference. Consequentially, traditional conceptions of Being have been rendered in ways that refer to it as if it were a being. Further, in consequence, traditional conceptions of things (such as the Earth, tables, people, animals, etc.) have not been thought of in terms of their Being. To give an example, referring to humans as a substance of “formed matter,” does not account for the Being of humans. Thinking of humans as some essential “thing” that should adhere to a strict set of rules to match its ‘essence’, does not account for the Being of humans. In thinking about beings just as beings, rather than in terms of their Being, we concern ourselves with physical, scientific (Wissenschaften), or normative facts about entities, instead of the meaning of their existence and their intelligibility as beings. To treat beings in terms of their Being is to let beings Be. To not treat beings in terms of their Being, is not to let beings Be.

Section 4: Zhuangzi and Mozi: Being and beings

In conceiving of the Dao, where Zhuangzi and Mozi differ is with respect to the ontological difference. Zhuangzi’s conception of the Dao is a conception which is concerned with Being (as the Being of entities/beings). Mozi’s conception of the Dao, by contrast, is a conception which is concerned with beings as beings.[1]

Zhuangzi’s Heaven is strikingly impersonal. Heaven for Zhuangzi, is what generates each “this.” (30) In other words, for Zhuangzi, heaven is that which makes beings intelligible in their Being –and intelligible as beings. Heaven for Zhuangzi is not the prescriber of how things ought to be. Rather, Heaven is simply the a priori grounding for the possibility of things to be and for things to be intelligible as they are. When we are on Heaven’s (nature’s) course, there isn’t some sort of overarching entity telling us what to do. Rather, we are simply acting according to our inborn natures –or, our Being as it pertains to who we really are deep down. So, the Dao entails regarding things –including ourselves — not as beings, but rather, in terms of their Being: “Only by never becoming a thing even when he is a thing can he let things be things. One who understands that letting things be things is done by not being a thing does much more than merely govern all the people of the world!” (95 Zhuangzi) As mentioned in section 1, all this entails is non-doing (being-in-the-world), rather than stipulating to oneself or others a set of values to use to determine how to act in the world. For Zhuangzi, Heaven is synonymous with nature, so all that is being demonstrated (rather than prescribed, perse) is that the Dao is simply acting according to one’s own inborn nature –not, by contrast, strict adherence to the norms of one’s context, which might not align with your inborn nature. Let’s say your inborn nature is to play the guitar; playing the guitar all day, every day, means that you are on the Course of Heaven, because you’re just following your natural inclinations undisturbed. To throw a wrench in such guitar playing due to external influences, is to veer off the course of Heaven (the Dao). Being aligned with Heaven is simply being aligned with [one’s own] nature. Heaven doesn’t tell us to do anything and heaven does not have any explicit rules for us to follow. This is because Heaven isn’t an entity or a being in the Zhuangzi. We –and the rest of nature — are too complicated for such strictness. But we can only understand this when we refer to ourselves in terms of our Being, which by necessity, does not have a fixed essence: “Each thing necessarily has someplace from which it can be affirmed as thus and so, and someplace from which it can be affirmed as acceptable.” (15) When we refer to things in terms of their Being, we come to understand that each thing has such a “someplace.” For Zhuangzi, when we operate according to the Dao, we let beings Be, precisely because we refer to them and understand them in terms of their being, which shows the unfixed essences of beings: “Such a person would not deploy any one particular way of defining rightness but would instead entrust it to the everyday function of each being. Their everyday function is what works for them, and ‘working’ just means this opening up unto one another, their way of connecting… The sense in which everything and everyone is already doing precisely that, but without knowing it, and without knowing it to be right, is just what we mean by the Course.” (15)

Under Zhuangzi’s Dao, the world does not register to me as a space full of material resources wherein I form such resources into items for exploitation, or as some sort of science experiment or as a space where there are beings who are “out of alignment” who need to be “fixed”, in a normative sense. Instead, the world under the Dao registers as a world full of significance, for which I engage in concernfully and meaningfully. (Daodejing: 22) Under the Dao of Zhuangzi, one is no longer thinking about the past or the future, and one is no longer concerned with external matters, like the norms of one’s context. Instead, one is purely occupied, rather than concerned with the current “this”–whether it is a walk in the park, enjoying food, doing something creatively (Daodejing: 80) — and insofar as “this” aligns with your inborn nature/own-most Being, you are acting according to the Dao. The Dao, in essence, is to regard things in terms of their Being and to act according to your own-most Being –which, is to regard yourself in terms of your Being. “Being united with heaven as it was in ancient times,” (Daodejing: 68) is not the adherence to a set of rules, but rather, as acting according to your inborn nature –whether your Being is naturally oriented towards being a warrior, fighter, victor or employer, as long as you are being a competent warrior, fighter, victor or employer, and not deviating from these roles you are on the course of Heaven (the Dao.) Zhuangzi’s conception of the Dao is one that rejects the notion of “good” and “evil.” It is beyond normativity –which means that, when one is conceiving of things in a normative manner, one has veered off the Course (one is no longer regarding things in terms of their Being.) (Zhuangzi: 80)

Mozi’s conception of the Dao, by stark contrast, is pre-occupied with beings as beings, rather than beings in terms of their Being. And this is also evident by the Mohist conception of Heaven and what its intentions towards said beings are. Firstly, in Mozi, Heaven is treated as a being. This is indicated by the fact that heaven has intentions and rules. Heaven rewards and punishes people. “Heaven cares about the people deeply.” (Mozi: 97) 27.2b-27.2d are great examples of heaven as a being. In these sections, it seems rather clear that Heaven has a will, and does things with it. The Dao and Heaven are essentially in alignment, both in Mohism and in Taoism. When one acts according to Heaven, one is on the course. Taoism’s rendition of Heaven is quite clearly akin to Being as we see it in Heidegger, as, acting in alignment with Heaven for Zhuangzi is simply to let beings Be (allow them to flourish in their inborn nature) and to regard things in terms of their Being. Heaven for Mozi, instead, is the antithesis of the Heideggerian notion of “Being.” It is a being, which Being in its very essence, cannot be. And the way in which the course manifests in the Mozi is further evidence of Mozi’s emphasis on beings, rather than Being.

Mozi does not seem to have much interest in what it means to be a person. The meaning of an individual’s life as it pertains to their Being plays essentially no role in Mozi’s philosophy. This disinterest seems to rest in Mohism’s communitarianism and emphasis on the state and society. This is not to say that political and ethical concerns are, by necessity, only concerned with beings rather than the Being of beings. Indeed, there are political sentiments articulated in Plato’s Republic that are based upon letting beings Be:

“Surely we set down and often said, if you remember, that each one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit.”

“Yes, we were just saying that.”

“And further, that justice is the minding of one’s own business and not being a busybody, this we have both heard from many others and have often said ourselves.” (Republic 433a-433b)

Keep in mind that, within the Republic, this conception of justice with respect to the city is also with respect to the “soul.” Which is to say, what is “just” is when everyone does what is best suited to them naturally and when everyone leaves each other alone –in the sense that, they do not attempt to throw others out of alignment with their inner nature. If Zhuangzi were to hypothetically advocate for a political system –one that is aligned with his conception of the Dao, rather than pure political apathy or even anarchy, and an absence of terms like “justice”[2] — it might look something like “not being a busybody” and having a space in which everyone is simply, and in an unprompted manner, doing what “his nature made him most naturally fit” to do.

But Mozi’s system is the opposite of this. Mohism’s system is the pinnacle of being a “busybody.” In the Mohist system, there is a strict rejection of “minding one’s own business,” (433c) as it is put in the Republic. Which, in other words, means that there is a strict rejection of letting beings Be. For instance, within the Mozi, citizens are essentially instructed to be informants. This is to say, insofar as you see that someone is not acting according to Heaven’s intent –say, for instance, you see your neighbor overly indulging on music — Mozi informs us to admonish such individuals and report them to your superiors. (Mozi: 35–37) Such is the lifeblood of not letting beings Be. Another example: Mozi explicitly instructs us to put our inner nature –which can consist of our own moral sentiments (which to Mozi’s eye, might be “bad” — in a position of subordination: this is referred to as “identifying upward.” And the language surrounding such instruction consists of commands, rather than recommendations: “What the district head deems right, all must deem right.” (Mozi: 35) The idea here is that we must put our inner natures aside for the greater good (in the normative sense of “good”) of the community and its utility. We cannot go along with the present “this” as whatever that might be, may not be in line with the mandates of Heaven’s intent.

Social order (zhi) for Mozi, is all-encompassing. It entails a strict set of moral guidelines to which everyone is expected to adhere to. When our inner-nature (i.e. when we let beings Be) does not align with these guidelines, Mozi believes we must disrupt the inner-nature of beings. What matters is what benefits the community, even if the inner-nature of individuals must be disrupted in order to attain this end –and, therein, for humans to be on the course. To this extent, Mozi’s concept of the Dao is more concerned with beings, as opposed to Being. On the one hand, its strict and explicit normativity renders Mozi’s Dao one which isn’t concerned with the Being of beings, but rather, the behavior of the masses as it pertains to the divine law –“morality” being what Heidegger refers to as a “regional ontology”, which is concerned with beings as opposed to Being. Fundamental ontology, which is concerned with the Being of beings, by contrast, is expressly non-normative. To disrupt the inner-nature of individual beings is to, strictly speaking, not regard them in terms of their Being. Instead, it is to regard beings as [moral] beings. But what does this look like? As stated earlier, the Being of humans entails an unfixed essence. The presumption in a unified/universal theory of norms –which are imposed strictly and necessarily in the Mozi — as the route to order, is that humans, rather, have a fixed essence. For, it can only make sense in a world where the essence of humans is fixed where the ideal state-of-affairs is for everyone to have the same exact model for behaving in the world. (Mozi: 5) Indeed, this is not even an inference based on what has already been stated about Mohism; rather, the presumption is expressly articulated by Mozi: “inclusive care” as a moral concept entails the belief that humans will necessarily reciprocate kindness. Even from a folk perspective, this is clearly an erroneous presumption; we’ve all been on the receiving end of unreciprocated kindness. This is not to be confused as some sort of polemic against being kind to people; rather, it is simply to state that “those who care about others will surely be cared about,” (Mozi: 62) is delusional; but, it is also indicative of the idea of fixed human essences, due to its being perceived as a necessary human characteristic: one which only makes sense when we do not regard humans in terms of their Being.

For Mozi, Heaven –the source of the Dao and its explicit/concrete principles — is a being. For Zhuangzi, Heaven is not a being. Rather, for Zhuangzi, Heaven is synonymous with [our inner] nature. Heaven for Zhuangzi does not play the role of the ultimate normative authority for which the Dao is to be based upon. The Dao for Zhuangzi is generated by Heaven as it generates humans and other entities: there are many paths, but Heaven does not prescribe any explicit path for all of us. Rather, in letting beings Be –in simply letting the inner-nature of individuals unfold without external interruption — one is on the path. Which is to say, for Zhuangzi, the Dao is the Dao insofar as we regard beings in terms of their Being. The Dao for Zhuangzi, like Heidegger’s notion of Being, is non-normative in its nature. By contrast, for Mozi, the Dao is the Dao insofar as we do not regard beings in terms of their Being, which is evidenced by Mozi’s assertion to not let beings Be and by the normative nature of Mozi’s conception of the Dao. Thus, both in the conception of Heaven and in the Dao, Zhuangzi and Mozi differ, and they differ by their demonstration of Heidegger’s ontological difference –Zhuangzi is concerned with the Being of beings and Mozi as concerned with beings as beings. From an ontological perspective, therefore, Zhuangzi’s thought is concerned with fundamental ontology, and Mozi’s is concerned with regional ontology.

Endnotes

[1] In this section, I will be thinking about Mozi and Zhuangzi in Heideggerian terms. Hence, when I speak about the Being of beings, part of what this entails is an unfixed essence. When I speak of referring to beings as beings, it is to think of beings as not having a fixed essence. The former, as we will see, is characteristic of Zhuangzi, and the latter is characteristic of Mozi. The Dao for Zhuangzi, therefore, is preoccupied with Being, whereas the Dao of Mozi, is preoccupied with beings. As, the former preoccupation regards beings as unfixed in their essence, while the latter does not.

[2] Kwek, D.H.B. Critique of Imperial Reason: Lessons from the Zhuangzi. Dao 18, 411–433 (2019).